MODERN FRENCH PHILOSOPHY.
THE IDEOLOGISTS

—THE TRADITIONALISTS.
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CONDORCET

belonged

to a

L.

LEVY-BRUHL.

group

philosophers who, under

of

the Republic, the Consulate and the Empire, upheld the spirit

and who gave themselves
Their doctrine has generally been
judged with excessive severity. It has been represented as the tail
this philosophy, it is said, already narrow as it
of Condillacism
came from its founder, became more and more thin and poor in the
hands of the ideologists, until it was reduced to a mere theory of
knowledge, semi-psychological and semi-logical, devoid of origi-

and methods

the

name

of the eighteenth century,

of "ideologists."

;

and with no hold on men's minds. This picture is very much
exaggerated to be convinced of this, we need only remember how
strong was Napoleon's anxiety to stop the mouths of "those ideolHe would not have taken the trouble, had their philosogists."
ophy really been so insignificant.
According to Destutt de Tracy, who is, together with Cabanis,
the most noteworthy of the ideologists, we cannot know the beginning of anything, neither that of men, nor that of the universe.
What was formerly called
Questions of origin are unanswerable.
Researches
metaphysics is the most shallow thing in the world.
nality

;

on the nature

of the soul or

on the

first

Whether we examine
without ourselves, all that we may hope
evitably vain.

a

deeper and deeper knowledge

of the

object of philosophy, or ideology,
us

when we

is

principle of things are in-

the
to

phenomena

accomplish

is

within or
to acquire

laws of nature. The proper
study what takes place in

to

It then becomes the basis of
think, speak, or reason.
economics, legislation and the other moral sciences.
Ideology recognizes as its founder Condillac, who first clearly

ethics,
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propounded the problem of the origin of our knowledge, and pointed
out a suitable method for its solution. But from the outset, Destutt
He does not admit that attention is a
de Tracy differs with him.
mere transformed sensation, and consequently rejects the whole
He
genesis of understanding and will as conceived by Condillac.
propounds another theory according to which there are four faculsensibility, memory, judgment, and
ties of the soul, and only four
volition, which he calls four irreducible "modes of sensation."
:

Condillac ascribed to the active sense of touch the acquisition
of the idea of

something outside ourselves.

De Tracy shows

the ex-

planation to be insufficient, and felicitously completes it: "When
a being organised so as to will and feel, feels within him volition

and at the same time resistance against this action
by him, he is assured of his own existence, and of
Action willed and
the existence of something that is not himself.
these are
felt on the one hand, and resistance on the other hand
the links between our self and other beings, between beings that
feel and beings that are felt." Any other sensation than this, commencing or terminating independently of our will, would be powerless to give us this idea. De Tracy is here nearer to Maine de Biran
than to Condillac. In a similar way, in his Logique, De Tracy does
not admit, with Condillac, that our judgments are equations, that
our reasonings are series of equations, and that ideas compared in
We must say, on
a judgment or in right reasoning are identical.
and even in
judgment
kind
of
equations
are
a
contrary,
that
the

and

action,

willed

and

felt

—

;

equations, the ideas compared together are not identical but

eqtiiv-

alent.

De Tracy

is

a clear, sincere,

and vigorous mind, holding firmly

to the principles of the eighteenth century philosophy, and not
shrinking from any consequences of these principles. The French

Revolution, to which he nearly
victions.

He

fell

a victim, did not

will not admit that a true doctrine

shake his conbe immoral

may

and claims entire liberty for philosophical
research.
Even morality is concerned in this liberty. For moral
principles are not innate, whatever Voltaire may have said to the
contrary.
It is a very ancient and absurd error to believe that
moral principles are in some sort injected into our heads, and the
same in every head, and to be led by this dream to attribute to
them a more celestial origin than to all other ideas which exist in
Moral science is of our own making, as all
our understanding.
others are, and similarly built up of the results of our experience
and reflexion. But it is subordinate to a knowledge of human na-

or dangerous for societ}',
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and the latter in its turn "depends upon the state of physics,
which it is but a part." So, though for his own part he made
use of a purely psychological method, De Tracy did not, in theory,
separate the moral from the natural sciences. Accordingly he said
that ideology was a part of zoology, or of animal physics, and dediture,

of

cated his Logiqiie to his friend Cabanis, the celebrated author of
the Rapports dii Physique et du Moral.

Cabanis has been looked upon as a materialist, but without
he purposely abstains from expressing any
metaphysical opinion. Like De Tracy, he declares that first causes
are not an object of science, not even an object of doubt, and that
on this point we are in a state of hopeless ignorance. But from an
experimental point of view, he ascertains that the brain is to thought
what the stomach is to digestion. As impressions reach the brain
they excite it to activity, just as food, when it enters the stomach,
stimulates in it a secretion of the gastric juice.
The proper function of the one is to perceive each particular impression, to attach
signs to it, to combine and compare together the different impressions, and to form therefrom judgments and determinations, just
sufficient reason, for

as the function of the other

From

is

to act

upon nutritious substances.

Cabanis derives the notorious formula "The brain in
some sort digests impressions it produces an organic secretion of
thought " a comparison which may be regarded as more or less
happy, but which is meant to be nothing but a comparison.
this

:

;

;

By

dint of psychological abstraction,

forgotten that

composed

man

is,

to

it

seemed

to

have been

use Bossuet's words, a natural whole,

of a soul and a body.
Cabanis comes back to this idea.
Being at the same time a physician and a psychologist, he shows,
by the aid of several hundred observations made upon man, both
in health and sickness, the reciprocal action of the body upon the
mind and of the mind upon the body. The physiology of Cabanis
is now quite out of date, but few have spoken better than he of the
influence of age, sex, temperament, illness, diet, climate, on the
formation of ideas and of moral affections.
If there are so many points of contact between the physical
and the moral being, it is because they rest on a common basis.
The operations called "moral," as well as the physical ones, result
directly from the action either of certain particular organs or of the
whole of the living system. All phenomena pertaining to intelligence and will take their rise in the primitive or accidental state of
the organism as well as the other vital functions.
The diversity of
functions is no reason why principles should be multiplied. As we

THE OPEN COURT.

414

do not assume a special principle

for digestion,

another for the

circulation of the blood, another for respiration, etc., neither

we assume one

for the intellectual functions.

It

is

must

sufficient to

Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis.
(1757-1808.)
Froii)

an engraving by Ambroise Tardieu.

functions, whether moral or physical, originate

recognise that

all

in sensibility, a

property

common

to all living

organisms.

Indeed,

*
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on the one hand, the utmost limit that we
life, and in the methodical
investigation of their connexion
and it is also, on the other hand,
the most general principle discovered by the analysis of the intellectual faculties and the affections of the soul.
Thus the physical
and the moral life meet at their source, or, rather, the moral being
is but the physical being considered from certain special points of
physical sensibility

is,

reach in the study of the phenomena of
;

The only

view.
is,

therefore, the

power, what

principle of the

power

is its

Sensibility

tion.

get beyond

When

is

phenomena

essence?

of

But what

of sensation.

is

animal existence
the cause of this

Philosophers will not ask this ques-

the universal fact in living nature.

We

cannot

it.

Cabanis finds

in

his path

any

of Condillac's theories

own researches, he
does not hesitate to reject them. Thus, Condillac maintained that
there are no psychological phenomena unperceived by consciousNothing, says Cabanis, is more contrary to experience. Alness.
that are incompatible with the results of his

though

it

is

a fact that the consciousness of impressions always

implies the existence and action of sensibility, the latter
theless, alive in

presence;

it

many

never-

regular functions, though the self

is

not at

all

sensibility without sensation,

its

many important and

nevertheless determines a great

There may be

is,

parts where the self nowise perceives

i.

aware
e.,

of its action.

without an im-

pression perceived.

Condillac said everything is acquired, even instinct. The paradox was bold, and Joseph de Maistre did not fail to laugh at it.
Cabanis looks upon instinct as innate, and infers therefrom that
external sensations are not, as Condillac declared, the sole prin-

Moral ideas and determinations do not de
life.
upon what are called sensations, that is, distinct impressions received by the organs of the senses properly so called. The

ciple of

pend

all

mental

solely

impressions resulting from the functions of several internal organs
contribute to them more or less, and, in certain cases, appear to

be the sole cause of their production. There is within us a whole
system of inclinations and determinations formed by impressions
almost totally unconnected with those of the external world; and
these inclinations necessarily influence our way of considering objects, the direction of our researches concerning them, and our
judgment of them. It is not, therefore, the external world alone
that shapes the thoughts and desires of the ^^ self; it is rather the
latter, pre-formed by instinct and by specific dispositions, that
builds for itself an external world with the elements of reality that
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interest

it.

tive activity.
of the

Likewise, spontaneous activity precedes in us reflecWe are first determined to act without being aware

means we employ, and often without even having conceived

a precise idea of the end

The

we

desire to attain.

consideration of instinct naturally leads to that of final

Cabanis admires the mutual dependency of all parts in
and is not surprised that observers of nature "who
were not close thinkers" should have been deeply affected by it.
But in truth, these marvels are inseparable from the very organisation of animals.
One may recognise them, and even extol them
with all the magnificence of language, without being forced to admit in the causes anything that does not belong to the necessary
conditions of every existence. What seems to us finality is merely
the result of natural laws, inasmuch as they make possible the ap
pearance, propagation and permanence of living species; if this
ordering of parts which we think wonderful and intentional should
cease to exist, living beings would disappear. So that, even when
the naturalist has recourse to final causes, the philosopher cannot
without imprudence seek in them an argument in favor of beliefs
concerning the author of nature.
But such reserve must be very
difficult to adhere to, since Cabanis, who recommends it, does not
causes.

living bodies,

himself observe

it.

In his Lettre a Fauriel sur

les

Causes Premieres

published after his death, Cabanis inclines toward a conception of
nature akin to that of the Stoics, in which ideas of order and final-

occupy a predominant place.
Cabanis has been widely read, and still deserves to be, were it
only for the abundance and the choice of the facts he brought together, the justness of most of his reflexions, and the pleasing elegance of his style. His influence extended not only to philosophers like Maine de Biran, Auguste Comte, H. Taine, but also to
novelists like Stendhal and his successors. Yet he has not escaped
Metaphysics, reviving,
the disrepute which overtook ideology.
threw into the shade those philosophers who had thought it finally
The ideologists had followed the way opened by the
banished.
encyclopaedists and the scientific men of the eighteenth century,
and were the first victims of a reaction which aimed higher than
ity

at

them.

The name given

to the traditionalist

philosophers exactly

in-

assumed over against the eighteenth cendoctrines, the common characteristic of which

dicates the position they

To a body of
was that they were based on the independent effort of individual
reason, they opposed a doctrine which discovered truth in traditury.
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men,

viz., religious tradition.

in tradition

that

Shall
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universally found

we say

that this

is

among

not a phil-

osophical doctrine, but the very negative of philosophy?

Were

such a negation was at least grounded on philosophical
reasons, that is to say, on a criticism of the opposing principles.
No doubt the traditionalists thought that they, as Christians, possessed the truth at the outset, before any discussion.
But they,
nevertheless, meant to combat the "philosophers" on their own
ground, to unmask their sophistries, to refute their errors, and
finally to compel them, by sheer force of demonstration, to confess
De Bonald, De Maistre, the
the weakness of individual reason.
two most illustrious representatives of this school, were looked
upon by all their contemporaries as formidable logicians, and, in
the judgment of Auguste Comte, for instance, De Maistre dealt the
philosophy of the eighteenth century some most telling blows.
Wherever this philosophy had seen "nature," De Bonald sees
"God." Nature to him is a vague and equivocal expression, and
cannot stand for a real cause. Nature is rather an effect, a system
of effects, a set of laws
but these laws imply a legislator who
founded the system and who maintains it. The universe is unintelligible to him without a Creator who is at the same time a
Providence. Language, likewise, was attributed by the eighteenth
century philosophers (Rousseau excepted) to the invention of men.
This also is an untenable theory, all the more absurd as these philosophers understood perfectly well that language is inseparable
from thought and social life. Men never could have invented language had they not already lived in society; and they never could
have lived in society had they not already possessed language.
You cannot, De Bonald claims, get out of this circle unless you
admit this marvel for language is no less marvellous than the organism of living beings to be a gift from the Creator to rational
And it is the same with all similar questions: the philosbeings.
ophy of the eighteenth century looks back in the series of causes,
up to a certain point, where it stops, thinking it has reached the
fundamental principle; but this so-called principle explains nothing, and must in its turn be explained.
Religion alone, which is a
deeper sort of philosophy, attains to the first principle on which
all things depend.
Truth is therefore to be found in tradition. The pride of individual reason, which has despised this tradition, inevitably leads
Even such a well-balanced mind as that of Montesquieu
to error.
did not escape it. All his theory of constitutions is false. Modern
this true,

;

—

—
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De Bonald,

is the wisdom of man and not that of
wisdom of the depraved man and not
that of the social or perfect man; it tries to make the intelligent
man turn to natural religion. But this philosophical religion, the

philosophy, says

society; that

is

to say, the

pure worship of Divinity, of the Great Being, of the Being of Beings, in a word, theism, infallibly leads to atheism, as the philosophical government of political societies, the division and balance
of power in the state, or representative government, inevitably
leads to anarchy.
It is a mistake for man to assume the task of constituting so^.
ciety or establishing government.
His intervention can only spoil
the work of Providence. It is society, on the contrary, which, being
founded on necessary relations, that is, relations established by

God, constitutes the individual man, and
must govern his conduct.

The same leading

dictates the

rules that

ideas are expressed by Joseph de Maistre,

but with such eloquence and passion as to

The eighteenth

make them wonderfully

is one of the
most shameful epochs in the history of the human mind. Its philosophy is a most degrading and fatal system.
It has robbed reason of her wings and made her grovel like a filthy reptile it has
dried up the divine source of poetry and eloquence, and caused all
the moral sciences to perish. And why did it produce these frightful effects? Because this whole philosophy was nothing but a veritable system of practical atheism.
To pronounce the name of God
It was the work
in its presence would throw it into convulsions.
of the "Evil One," it was "the denying spirit," like Mephistopheles.
Moreover, according to De Maistre, the eighteenth century
merely applied to politics the principles of the Reformation, or, as
he says, of the "rebels" of the sixteenth century. The sixteenth
and the seventeenth centuries might be called the premises of the
eighteenth, which in fact was but the conclusion of the two preceding ones.
"The human mind could not suddenly have risen to
such a pitch of audacity as we have witnessed.
Philosophism
could not have been erected except on the broad foundation of the
Reformation."
The hostility of De Maistre is clear-sighted, and he struck home
when he pointed out the inconsistency of those philosophers, who
praised so highly the experimental method, yet had not patience
enough to practise it, so anxious were they to substitute something
" It was a singularly
for the traditions they were pulling down.

impressive.

century, according to him,

;

.

.

.

ridiculous trait of the eighteenth century to judge of everything

MODERN FRENCH

PHlL0SOPil\

419

.

according to abstract rules, without regard to experience
is

the

more

;

and

it

strikingly ridiculous because this very century at the

same time kept continually sparring

at

all

philosophers

abstract principles as their starting-point, instead of

them in the light of experience." Every one
ophers" in turn is roughly handled by De Maistre.
for

Joseph

who took

first

looking

of the "philosI

do not speak

De Maistre.

;i754-iS2i.)

After a sketch by Bouillon.

Lithographed by Villain.

whom he feels a sort of fury which almost
overpowers him but Locke, whom the philosophers all hailed as
master, is no longer "the wise Locke," the "greatest of all philosophers since Plato " he is a shart-sight&d, narrow-minded man,
not wicked, but simple, shallow, spiritless, a poor philosopher, a
mere pigmy beside the " Christi.an Plato^" that is, Malebranche
only of Voltaire, against
;

;
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who has been sacrificed to him. The infatuation of which he has
been the object is simply ludicrous. The same is said of Bacon,
whom De Maistre honors with a special indictment. His dislike is
no less for Condillac, "who sees the truth perfectly well, but who
had rather die than confess it " an odious writer, perhaps, that
one of all the philosophers of the eighteenth century who was most
on his guard against his own conscience.
These philosophers tried to persuade individual reason that it
was the sovereign judge of what is false and what is true, that the
progress of mankind depended upon that of the sciences, and that
ignorance and superstition were the causes of moral and social
;

evil.

He

De

Maistre denies

all this

much

as confidently as they asserted

it.

Reason, he declares, stands manifestly convicted of incompetence as a guide for
men, for few men are in a fit state to reason well, and none can
reason well on all subjects; so that, generally speaking, it is advis"I do not mean to insult reason,'
able to begin with authority.
says De Maistre, " I have infinite respect for it in spite of all the
disparages reason as

wrong

has done us

it

common

;

as they exalted

but whenever

we must put

it

it.

stands in opposition to

from us like poison." And, indeed,
the general feeling of all men forms "a system of intuitive truths'
It is a
against which the sophistries of reason cannot prevail.
"mysterious instinct" which we are bound to obey. This instinct
it is almost inoften guesses aright, even in the natural sciences
sense,

it

;

fallible in

dealing with rational philosophy, ethics, metaphysics,

and natural theology, "and it is infinitely worthy of the supreme
wisdom, which created and regulated all things, to have enabled
man to dispense with science in all that most greatly concerns him."
Science that is the source from which proceed dangerous extravagancies, rash self-assumption and proud blasphemy. Not that
but it must be pursued only under certain init is bad in itself
For want of this precaution the more
dispensable conditions.
Bacon is quite
things our mind knows the more guilty it may be.
" ludicrous " when he is provoked at scholasticism and theology.
Teach young people physics and chemistry before having imbued
them with religion and morality, and you will see the result. There
lurks in science, when it is not entirely subordinate to "national
dogmas," a something which tends to debase man and to make him
Science is not and ought not to be the
a useless or bad citizen.
chief aim of the intelligence. Whence come, for instance, the multiplied complaints, and, one might say, revilings against Providence ? From this great phalanx of men called scientists, whom
!

;
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not in this century been able to keep in their proper place,
In former times, there were very few
a subordinate one.

We have
which
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and among these few only a very small number
they are legion, and the exception has become
the rule.
They have usurped a boundless influence. Yet it is not
Nothing really essential is entrusted to
for science to guide men.
it.
Science is an intellectual pastime, and in the material order of

men

of science,

were impious.

things

it

is

Now

capable of useful applications; but there its domain
to the prelates, the nobles, the higher officers

"It belongs

ends.

of the state to

be the depositories and guardians of saving truths,

what is wrong and what is right, what is true and
Others have no
the moral and spiritual worlds.
They have the natural sciences
right to reason on such matters.
As to the
of what can they complain?
to divert themselves with
man who speaks or writes in order to take away from the people a
national dogma, he ought to be hanged as one who robs the hearth
and home."
It would be difficult to carry the reaction against the favorite
Yet De Maistre is in this
ideas of the eighteenth century further.
not merely obeying the desire to restore the rights of tradition and
religious authority and to abate the chimerical and sinful pretenHe founds his
sions of such men as Helvetius and Condorcet.
opinion also on a conception of the universe and its relation to
God, which leaves to positive science but limited scope and range.
The world of visible phenomena and of the laws which regulate
them is a world of appearance and illusion which hides from our
sight the world of true and essential reality. Therefore, the closer
our science grasps phenomena and their laws, the farther it is,
to teach nations

what

is false, in

;

with all its air of truth, from being really true or, at least, it is
only imperfectly and comparatively true, like the appearances which
are its object. The religious man who sees God everywhere in the
;

world

;

the poet,

moved by the beauty of
human destiny; even

tragic character of

the universe and by the
the metaphysician

discovers the invisible beneath the visible, are

all

who

three infinitely

nearer to truth, harmony, and the eternal substance, than the

man

measuring and weighing atoms in his laboratory.
Consequently De Maistre has a constant tendency to explain
nothing by secondary causes, and always to appeal to mystery and
God's unfathomable designs. He gives an admirable description
of the struggle for life, and of the competition between living species
he sees clearly that war is a particular phase of this great
fact; but instead of seeking the cause, as Diderot or Darwin did,
of science

;
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laws of nature, he sees in it simply a "divine" laW,
"The earth,
and founds thereupon a whole theory of sacrifice.
continually deluged with blood, is only an immense altar on which
all that has life must be slain, and that without end, or measure,
He likeor rest, till the end of all things, till the death of death."
wise insists upon the mutual responsibility of all the members of
one family, and of all the members of mankind, and upon the rein the general

versibility of penalties

;

but instead of seeking the origin of these
and religion of primitive societies, he

beliefs in the constitution

The words superstition and
sees here again a "divine" law.
God's directing hand is everyprejudice are to him meaningless.
where in the world if we do not see it, it is because we refuse to do
so.
A family is thought to be royal because it reigns; whereas,
;

on the contrary,

We

it

reigns because

shall not set forth here

it is

De

royal.

Maistre's ideas on the spiritual

sovereignty of the Pope, the significance of the French Revolution,

and the constitution best suited for modern nations. We must lose
no time in returning to more properly philosophical doctrines. But
more than once, in these doctrines, shall we observe unquestionable traces which prove the influence of the chief traditionalists,
De Maistre, De Bonald, Ballandre and Lamennais. De Maistre,
especially, made upon many minds a deep and lasting impression.
Even if Auguste Comte had not formally acknowledged the fact,
his very doctrine would be sufficient to prove his indebtedness to
De Maistre for many of his historical, social, and religious ideas.

